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The public sphere should be regulated so the distribution of political speech does 
not correlate with the distribution of income or wealth. A public sphere where 
people can fund any political speech from their private holdings is epistemically 
defective. The argument has four steps. First, if political speech is unregulated, 
the rich predictably contribute a disproportionate share. Second, wealth tends to 
correlate with substantive political perspectives. Third, greater quantities of 
speech by the rich can “drown out” the speech of the poor, because of citizens’ 
limited attention span for politics. Finally, the normative problem with all this 
is that it reduces the diversity of arguments and evidence citizens become familiar 
with, reducing the quality of their political knowledge. The clearest implication 
of the argument is in favour of strict contribution limits and/or public funding 
for formal political campaigns, but it also has implications for more informal 
aspects of the public sphere. 
INTRODUCTION 
Politics is ultimately a matter of speech acts, but speech on a 
large scale costs money. Where should this money come from? This ar-
ticle compares two models of how the public sphere should be paid for. 
Laissez-faire public sphere: Speakers are free to fund po-
litical speech using any money they have available to them in 
the market economy.  
Egalitarian public sphere: Regulations are in place that re-
duce the correlation between the distribution of political speech 
and the income or wealth of speakers. 
I argue that the laissez-faire public sphere is epistemically de-
fective because the rich will predictably dominate public discussion, re-
ducing the diversity of evidence and argument citizens are exposed to. 
By remedying this defect, a more egalitarian public sphere will improve 
the relevant political knowledge of citizens. An egalitarian public sphere 
can be advanced in many ways, but one obvious application is campaign 
finance. In contemporary democracies, contributions to campaigns are 
highly correlated with income or wealth. Limits to how much individu-
als may donate to political campaigns are indispensable for an egalitarian 
public sphere. 
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This article’s main epistemological contribution is to apply epis-
temology to politics. In the process, it contributes to other philosophical 
debates. In particular, it demonstrates that the epistemic benefits of (de-
liberative) diversity are only realised insofar as they engender epistemic 
diversity within individual minds. The well-known “diversity trumps 
ability” theorem (Hong and Page 2004) tends to obscure this, but it can 
be illuminated by thinking about falsification and multiple interpretive 
frames as social processes. While epistemologists are familiar with idea 
that the truth and the significance of propositions can come apart, this 
basic distinction has been neglected in the traditional epistemic argu-
ment for free speech. 
My argument for egalitarian regulation has three key premises: 
1. The public political sphere should be regulated to improve cit-
izens’ politically relevant knowledge. 
2. Familiarity with a more diverse range of perspectives would im-
prove citizens’ politically relevant knowledge. 
3. In a laissez-faire public sphere, the political speech that is actu-
ally listened to is skewed towards the perspectives of the rich. 
Section two discusses the first two premises of the argument, which 
provide the normative goals for policy. Section three reviews the case 
for a laissez-faire public sphere. The empirical premise for my argument 
is provided in section four: in a laissez-fire public sphere, the political 
speech citizens are actually aware of is skewed towards perspectives fa-
voured by the rich. Section five explains why, if this is the case, the goal 
of increasing citizens’ politically relevant knowledge is likely to be bet-
ter advanced in a more egalitarian public sphere. 
1. PRELIMINARIES 
I start by setting the scene. In the debate about money and pol-
itics, epistemic considerations have usually been taken to point in the 
direction of laissez-faire. Epistemic defences of (some degree of) laissez-
faire have been offered by David Estlund (2000) as well as the US Su-
preme Court, and have recently been prominently revived in the work 
of Ryan Pevnick (2016a; 2016b). 
Defenders of a more egalitarian public sphere, on the other 
hand, have tended to appeal to other considerations: avoiding corrup-
tion (Beitz 1990, 203–5; Christiano 2012, 242–45; Dawood 2015; 
Pevnick 2016a, 1186), relational egalitarianism (on which see Pevnick 
2016b, 73–75), and the intrinsic value of equality of opportunity (Rawls 
2001, chap. 45; Cohen 2001; Dworkin 2002). 
Egalitarians should not allow advocates of laissez-faire to retain 
possession of the epistemic high ground. The primary contribution of 
this paper is to show how egalitarian conclusions actually arise out of a 
careful consideration of the problems in the epistemic argument for a 
laissez-faire public sphere (section three). An epistemic argument for 
egalitarianism has the dialectical advantage of operating on the same ter-
rain as the most prominent laissez-faire argument, beating it at its own 
game. 
The normative premise of my argument is relatively weak: 
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The public political sphere should be regulated to improve cit-
izens’ politically relevant knowledge. 
It seems reasonable that policy made on the basis of better politically 
relevant knowledge (or made by legislators elected by more knowledge-
able voters) will tend to be more substantively just or moral. This prop-
osition will be true whatever the appropriate standards of justice or mo-
rality turn out to be, and indeed it is something that can be agreed on 
by people who favour different conceptions of justice (more on this be-
low). By contrast, considerable moral disagreement can be expected on 
the intrinsic value of equal opportunity for political influence, the dis-
tinct value of relational equality, or the substantive distributive injus-
tices caused by policies favoured by the rich. Advocates of a more egal-
itarian public sphere have struggled when these controversial moral val-
ues are framed as conflicting with the epistemic quality of decisions, as 
advocates of laissez-faire have argued that they do.  
Ultimately, the epistemic argument given here is not neces-
sarily in conflict with other reasons for a more egalitarian public sphere, 
such as those based on anti-corruption, relational equality or the intrin-
sic value of equality of opportunity. Nor does it preclude a pluralist ap-
proach that would assign some value to each consideration. While one 
can always devise thought-experiments in which these considerations 
point in different directions, under realistic conditions they all point in 
the direction of a more egalitarian public sphere.  
While the epistemic case for the egalitarian public sphere has 
been unfortunately neglected, some hints in this direction can be found 
in the work of Charles Beitz, Ronald Dworkin and Thomas Christiano, 
and it may be helpful to distinguish my argument from these three au-
thors.  
My argument exhibits the basic structure advocated by Beitz 
(1990, 209), who writes that if we end up choosing laws to promote 
equality in political speech, “the explanation would not be that equality 
of resources has intrinsic or fundamental importance but rather that it 
serves as a convenient proxy for a more complex criterion that would 
be excessively difficult to interpret or administer.” Beitz leaves the issue 
here; my contribution is to actually set out the more complex criterion 
(the diversity of arguments and evidence citizens are familiar with), and 
to set out a reason for thinking equality would be a good proxy for this 
criterion (the skewed distribution of sources in the laissez-faire public 
sphere).  
Similarly, Dworkin (2002, 364; 2010, sec. 2) asserts that a 
more egalitarian public sphere will enhance “democratic discourse”, but 
he never really explains why we should expect this to be the case, be-
yond a few suggestive remarks about “monopolies” in the “marketplace 
of ideas”. Generally, epistemic considerations in Dworkin’s theory tend 
mainly in the direction of laissez-faire, setting limits on egalitarian re-
forms which are motivated primarily by the intrinsic importance of 
equal opportunities for political influence. 
The author who has gone furthest in developing an epistemic 
justification for egalitarianism is Christiano, particularly in his account 
of how the laissez-faire public sphere leads to a skew towards the 
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perspectives of the rich in the public’s sources of political information. 
However, Christiano (2012, 252) does not fully make the connection 
to knowledge and diversity, stopping on the thought that the dominance 
of the rich “implies that an enormous amount of local knowledge fails to 
make an appearance in the public sphere.” Instead, Christiano’s primary 
interest in the dominance of the rich is as a premise in a relational egal-
itarian argument.1 
My subject is the political public sphere, which I understand as 
constituted by political speech. I use the term speech as a synecdoche for 
all discursive elements of political action: not only face-to-face talk but 
also newspaper editorials, TV adverts, posters, door-to-door campaign-
ing, protest marches etc. I draw a rough distinction between formal po-
litical campaigns (whether for elections or referenda), and the informal 
public sphere. My general argument applies to both, although there are 
some differences. The visibility of formal campaigns (and the problems 
with financing them) should not tempt us to exaggerate their im-
portance compared to the informal public sphere when it comes to 
forming citizens’ political beliefs (Dryzek 2001). However, the nature 
of formal political campaigns does make them an easier target for regu-
lation than the informal public sphere. Several issues around money in 
politics are quite specific to the context of formal campaigns. 
Importantly for what follows, I understand donations of money 
to campaigning organisations as a form of indirect or delegated speech, 
since donors provide others the financial resources to speak on their be-
half. In this respect I follow both Estlund (2000) and the US Supreme 
Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976). This should not be seen as an admission 
that epistemic arguments are side-constrained by free-speech consider-
ations, since epistemic considerations themselves are important in jus-
tifying free speech protections (Dworkin 2002; 2010). 
Within this general category of speech, my subject is further 
refined to what I call persuasive speech: speech that honestly attempts to 
change audiences’ beliefs. This excludes political speech with other 
goals, such as deliberate deception or motivating voters to act on beliefs 
they already have. Despite the fact that these other types of speech are 
particularly prevalent in formal political campaigns, the normative lit-
erature on campaign finance has focused almost exclusively on persua-
sive speech. This perhaps derives from an assumption that there is no 
unproblematic way to distinguish persuasion from motivation or decep-
tion in particular cases. In my case, the idealising assumption of persua-
sive speech is a deliberate concession to the laissez-faire argument. Since 
persuasive speech is the terrain most favourable to the laissez-faire ar-
gument, my argument will be all the more significant if it succeeds. 
 
1 Specifically, the dominance of the rich “suggests a publicly clear way in 
which the interests of the great majority of the population are not receiving 
significant attention in decision making. The interests of most people are not 
treated as worthy of much consideration.” Ibid. 
5 
 
2. KNOWLEDGE AND DIVERSITY AS GOALS FOR 
REGULATION 
With this background in place, I begin with the normative 
premise of my argument:  
The political public sphere should be structured to increase cit-
izens’ politically relevant knowledge 
That is, decisions about whether or how to regulate the public 
sphere should be guided by the goal of increasing this knowledge. As I 
indicated, this does not necessarily preclude other moral considerations 
from playing some role. Rather than entering into an argument about 
the relative importance of different considerations, I simply claim that 
the epistemic dimension is a very important consideration, and that it 
points in an egalitarian direction. In the previous section we saw that 
the ultimate grounding for my normative premise is that better in-
formed decisions tend to be more substantively just. The normative 
component here is deliberately thin; unpacking this idea and its impli-
cations is chiefly a matter of epistemology. 
Ultimately, the kind of knowledge we want citizens to possess 
is knowledge about how they should act politically – most obviously, 
how they should vote. 2  However, I will not appeal directly to prior 
beliefs about which policies and parties citizens should favour. Instead, 
I impose a constraint of impartiality on my theorising. This constraint 
means that in evaluating the comparative merits of the laissez-faire and 
egalitarian public spheres I avoid appealing to any substantive concep-
tion of justice or the desirability of any particular policy agenda. This 
constraint of impartiality in constitutional design can be justified in sev-
eral ways. It might be justified morally, on the basis that respecting oth-
ers requires settling political disputes with them in a neutral way which 
is not slanted towards one side or another (e.g. Estlund 2009). Alterna-
tively, impartiality in constitutional design might be justified more prag-
matically on the basis that since the function of a political system is to 
deal with disagreement, it would fail to do so effectively if it were de-
signed to favour one side or the other (e.g. Gerlsbeck 2018). Finally, 
setting aside any more general considerations in democratic theory, one 
might simply take it as a dialectical advantage for this particular argu-
ment to be free from any commitments to controversial theories of jus-
tice.  
The impartiality constraint rules out directly assessing people’s 
knowledge about how they should act politically. However, we can 
nonetheless identify factors that tend to help people acquire knowledge 
about what they should do politically. For example, people tend to 
reach better political judgements the more time they spend pondering 
the issues before them. Unfortunately this does not take us very far in 
thinking about how political speech is paid for, since there is little reason 
 
2 What I call “politically relevant knowledge” is thus very different from what 
political scientists normally call “political knowledge”. The latter refers spe-
cifically to knowledge of uncontroversial facts about the political process 
such as who the incumbents are, what parties they belong to etc. 
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to think that merely changing the way it is paid for will have much effect 
on the amount of time people devote to politics (Somin 2013, 185–
88).3 
This article focuses on a different factor: making the time voters 
do spend acquiring political  knowledge more effective. I claim that, 
other things being equal, familiarity with a more diverse set of relevant 
arguments and evidence increases citizens’ relevant political 
knowledge. This claim draws support from two different types of theo-
rising: firstly on the epistemic benefits of diversity, and secondly on the 
importance of falsification.  
Examples can help to illustrate each of these ideas. Imagine two 
people who each spend the same amount of time hearing from others 
about their life experiences. However, one of them almost exclusively 
talks with people who share the same social class. The other deliberately 
tries to talk with people who have a wide range of life experiences. Or, 
imagine two people who spend the same amount of time studying eco-
nomics. One of them concentrates exclusively on Marxist economics, 
while the other spends equal time on neo-classical, Austrian, Keynesian 
and Marxist schools of thought. Recall that the impartiality constraint 
rules out any preliminary conclusions about whose life experiences are 
most relevant to public policy or which school of economics is superior. 
Given this, my claim about exposure to a diversity of arguments and 
evidence implies that those who learn about a wider range of life expe-
riences or economic schools of thought are more likely to acquire 
knowledge which will help them make political decisions. Motivating 
this conclusion is that for reasoning of this kind, it is particularly im-
portant to be able to compare a range of different hypotheses. The value 
of familiarity with a range of lived experiences or traditions of thought 
lies in being able to examine the world through a variety of theoretical 
frames. The diversity which ultimately produces epistemic benefits here 
is the diversity of perspectives within the mind of one person. 
Moving onto falsification, imagine two voters deciding whether 
the Blue or Red party candidates would be best for the common good. 
The first voter is only exposed to pro-Blue sources, and develops a de-
tailed knowledge of the strengths of the Blue candidate and the weak-
nesses of the Red candidate. The second voter is exposed to a variety of 
sources, and comes to know something about the strengths and weak-
nesses of each candidate. Again, without knowing anything ourselves 
about the merits of the candidates, we should expect that the second 
voter is more likely to reach a good judgement. Notice that this conclu-
sion does not require any deception or falsehood: the beliefs that the 
first voter acquires from pro-Blue sources might be scrupulously accu-
rate in themselves. What makes the example interesting is precisely that 
the sheer quantity of true beliefs held by our two voters does not ex-
haust the question of how knowledgeable they are on the crucial ques-
tion of which candidate is superior. Indeed, the first voter might actually 
 
3 One way to increase the time voters devote to politics would be to reduce 
the number of voters by lottery, making their individual contributions more 
salient to the outcome (López-Guerra 2011; Guerrero 2014).  
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have a higher “quantity” of true beliefs on the subject (perhaps they spent 
twice as much time researching), and yet we would nonetheless say the 
second voter is likely to be more knowledgeable where it counts. This 
second example does not seem to be so well described as a case where 
it helps to be able to deploy a range of interpretive frames. Instead, our 
conclusion seems to be motivated by something more basic: the im-
portance of attending to sources that might falsify one’s starting hypoth-
esis rather than only attending to sources which tend to confirm it. 
These examples make clear that diversity within the public 
sphere is not enough. What really matters is diversity within each per-
son’s head – that a variety of arguments and evidence is available in their 
internal processes of belief-formation and decision-making. This claim 
may seem surprising, so it is worth briefly relating it to the literature on 
diversity, deliberation and epistemic democracy. Democracy is sup-
posed to produce epistemically superior decisions through two mecha-
nisms: counting (aggregative) and talking (deliberative) (Landemore 
2013; Vermeule 2013). The former refers to models such as the Con-
dorcet Jury Theorem, which work by using the law of large numbers to 
cancel out random errors. The latter refers to the sharing and joint pro-
duction of knowledge. My focus here is on deliberative mechanisms. 
With this focus, the only way diversity (and indeed deliberation in gen-
eral) can ultimately improve outcomes is by improving the knowledge 
of those who finally take decisions.  
This is easy to miss when looking at Lu Hong and Scott Page’s 
famous “diversity trumps ability” model (2004). Although presented as 
a model of group decision-making, it is not necessary to their model that 
the deliberating group makes the final decision at all. The group could 
just as well represent one autocrat and their counsellors. The question 
never arises because Hong and Page assume unanimous agreement on 
final decisions. This derives from the prior assumption that all group 
members instantly recognise a superior solution when they see one: ef-
fectively, any group member effortlessly acquires the relevant 
knowledge of all group members. Thus, when it comes to making deci-
sions, Hong and Page’s model makes no distinction between “diversity 
in the room” and “diversity within the mind of the decision-makers”. 
But when these things come apart, as they will in real politics, voting 
choices will be determined by what is in the mind of each voter. Diver-
sity in the room only impacts on final decisions via impacting the beliefs 
of each voter.  
In summary, we should endorse Beitz’s statement that what we 
should care about when it comes to campaign finance is the ability of all 
views to get a decent hearing (1990, 213). Moreover, whether it was 
Beitz’s intended meaning or not, we should emphasise that a variety of 
views need to be heard – not merely spoken.  
Affirming the epistemic value of diversity in politics naturally 
raises questions about how much diversity is too much. After all, people 
could increase the diversity of frames available to them (and seek to fal-
sify their prior beliefs) by learning about long-abandoned pseudoscience 
8 
 
and folklore.4 If there is a trade-off between becoming more familiar 
with the most plausible perspectives and becoming familiar with a wider 
range of perspectives, there must be some point at which the former is 
more epistemically beneficial than the latter. It would thus be unwise to 
think that the epistemic benefits of diversity apply with too much gen-
erality. 
However, within the specific context of politics, the claim that 
more diversity would be epistemically beneficial remains very plausible, 
because the mechanisms motivating it seem particularly important. 
First, politics is a sphere where abductive reasoning is particularly im-
portant, where one tries to infer the best explanations from sets of evi-
dence which are both vast and incomplete. For this type of reasoning, 
exemplified by the economics example, a diversity of interpretive 
frames is particularly important. Second, politics is a sphere in which 
people are particularly susceptible to confirmation bias. This makes it 
especially important for people to attend to a variety of sources so as to 
be more likely to encounter information that falsifies their starting hy-
potheses (Heath 2015, chap. 5). Our natural cognitive biases push us 
towards a sub-optimally low level of diversity in the arguments and ev-
idence we pay attention to. This suggests that we should structure our 
public sphere to lean against these natural biases: my proposals here are 
just one way of doing so. My argument in sections four and five relies 
only on the claim that from where we stand now, it would be epistem-
ically beneficial for citizens to be aware of a more diverse set of relevant 
arguments and evidence. Moreover, this need not apply generally so 
long as it applies specifically to topics where people’s perspectives are 
influenced by their socio-economic status.  
My normative premise is that the public sphere should be reg-
ulated with the goal of realising these potential epistemic gains through 
diversity. Having set this out, I now turn to an alternative argument that 
relies on similar epistemic premises. 
3. THE CASE FOR THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE PUBLIC SPHERE 
This section reconstructs the case for the laissez-faire public 
sphere. Arguments along these lines have been put forward by Pevnick 
and Estlund; both offer more nuanced versions of the basic logic de-
ployed by the US Supreme Court. I will take Pevnick as the best repre-
sentative of this view, since he focuses on the core of the positive argu-
ment for laissez-faire, whereas Estlund’s proposal is more intricate and 
idiosyncratic. 
 
4 More sympathetically, cf. J.S. Mill (1989, 45): “The loss of so important an 
aid to the intelligent and living apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the 
necessity of explaining it to, or defending it against, opponents, though not 
sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling drawback from the benefit of its univer-
sal recognition. Where this advantage can no longer be had, I confess I should 
like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a substitute for 
it; some contrivance for making the difficulties of the question as present to 
the learner’s consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a dissentient 
champion, eager for his conversion.” 
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 According to Pevnick, “the same Millian argument that under-
lies the ordinary commitment to freedom of speech also provides pre-
sumptive reason to worry about prohibitions on campaign-related 
spending.” More speech (more resources devoted to campaigning) is al-
ways epistemically valuable.5 Of course, the idea cannot be that each 
individual additional speech act is always epistemically valuable. Even 
setting aside deliberate deception, some propositions turn out in the end 
to be false. So, the idea must be more subtle: each additional speech act 
probabilistically tends to be epistemically beneficial (or, better, each 
speech act has a positive expected epistemic value). Hence the relevance 
of a Millian competition of ideas: so long as everybody can speak, addi-
tional speech will tend to be epistemically positive because false or mis-
leading speech will be rooted out and exposed by other speakers. This 
closely corresponds the falsification argument for diversity that I gave in 
the previous section. 
Pevnick’s distinctive addition to this traditional argument is to 
point out that large amounts of money are necessary to propagate ideas 
in mass politics. Broadcasting a message (for example in a radio advert) 
only once is unlikely to reach many people. The same message must be 
broadcast again and again to make it likely that a significant number of 
people actually hear it. Thus, seemingly repetitive speech which brings 
no new ideas to the public sphere in general may nonetheless bring new 
ideas to additional individuals who hear it each time. And it is the ele-
ment of repetition that costs significant sums of money.  
Pevnick’s approach is summarised in his comment on Ross 
Perot, a US billionaire who paid for his own presidential campaigns in 
1992 and 1996:  
Citizens persuaded by Perot had the opportunity to vote for a 
candidate raising issues and concerns not being discussed by 
others. Meanwhile, citizens who rejected Perot’s case remained 
free to vote for other candidates, but were at least exposed to 
an ardent advocate of a competing perspective. The Millian 
proposition is that, in at least one important sense, both sets of 
voters were better off because of Perot’s willingness to spend 
part of his fortune on political speech. (2016b, 59) 
Pevnick is keen to qualify his argument as establishing only a 
“presumption” against restrictions, meaning, 
it picks out one important epistemic concern. There are, of 
course, other important considerations, and even competing 
epistemic considerations (such as concerns about the distribu-
tion of resources devoted to different views)… I simply seek to 
show that the prohibitions needed to instantiate EOPI [equal 
opportunity for political influence] have one important type of 
cost that needs to be taken into account in any prescriptive dis-
cussion of campaign finance. (2016b, 58) 
 
5 Cohen (2001), Estlund (2000) and Dworkin (2002), interpret Buckley 
(1976) as making the same argument. 
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However, even this cautious formulation is mistaken. More speech does 
not always generate greater voter awareness of different arguments and 
evidence. Under some circumstances, more speech can actually reduce 
voters’ awareness of different arguments and evidence: it has negative 
expected epistemic value. Under such circumstances, prohibitions on 
private spending do not carry the epistemic cost Pevnick asserts at all. 
This article identifies one set of circumstances in which this is the case.  
The crucial mistake here (not one limited to Pevnick) is aggre-
gating “political speech” as a homogenous good. Treated like an eco-
nomic commodity in this way, it seems clear that, other things being 
equal, more is better. When we proceed more carefully and examine 
how political speech can be disaggregated, this assumption is unwar-
ranted. This is the kind of analysis I will undertake in the next section. 
The laissez-faire public sphere has a second line of defence: a 
denial that political speech can be disaggregated without creating unac-
ceptable dangers of manipulation and corruption. Certainly, any direct 
attempt by the state to differentiate between epistemically valuable or 
harmful speech would be highly problematic and liable to abuse by in-
cumbent officeholders. But that is not what is being envisaged here. In-
stead, we can identify very general scenarios in which speech is likely to 
be epistemically harmful and regulate these. Restrictions on speech 
should be content- or viewpoint-neutral, and should not allow legisla-
tors or bureaucrats to treat speech differently on the basis of its actual 
content. Prohibitions on private donations to political campaigns do not 
have this feature: they do not involve the state in any judgement about 
the worth of the actual content being communicated. Of course, the 
details of any scheme of regulation and public funding will have to be 
carefully interrogated for any accountability concerns. Although 
Pevnick focuses on the funding of formal campaigns, he too is keen to 
generalise to the informal public sphere; the same goes for my critique.  
4. THE DOMINANCE OF THE RICH IN THE LAISSEZ-FAIRE 
PUBLIC SPHERE  
I now proceed to the substance of that critique. This section 
explains the problem with the laissez-faire public sphere. In a laissez-
faire public sphere, the set of arguments and evidence citizens are famil-
iar with will be skewed towards perspectives favoured by the rich. This 
is the first step of my argument for egalitarian regulations; the second 
step will be considered in the following section. The first step goes as 
follows: 
1. Political speech (insofar as it is actually listened to) is subject to 
scarcity 
2. In a laissez-faire public sphere, the rich contribute a dispropor-
tionate share of speech 
Therefore  
3. In a laissez-faire public sphere, the political speech that is actu-
ally listened to is skewed towards the perspectives of the rich 
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The key premise here is that political speech is subject to scar-
city, such that more speech from one party can “drown out” speech from 
another. This point has been well argued by Christiano (2012, 248–49). 
On the face of it, “drowning out” seems like an odd claim. Especially 
since the development of the internet, there is no “message scarcity”: 
you can always get your message out somewhere, and there are no tech-
nical barriers to it being read by almost unlimited numbers of people. 
There is, however, “cognitive scarcity” in the amount of attention indi-
viduals devote to an issue. In response to this cognitive scarcity, the me-
dia industry has created well-packaged, easily digestible sources of news 
and opinion, and it is rational for individuals to get their political infor-
mation from these sources. It is in these crucial packaged information 
sources that the perspectives of the poor are (relatively) drowned out. 
There will always be space on the internet, but the number of pages in 
The Sun, the number of hours Fox News broadcasts in a day, and even the 
amount of stories on the Buzzfeed front page are limited. Of course, The 
Sun could always decide to add additional pages to the paper, Fox could 
add more channels, and Buzzfeed could add more stories to the front 
page. Ultimately however, the space for reaching people remains lim-
ited; increasing the size of a publication like The Sun would merely re-
duce the average number of viewers for each item within it, or even put 
viewers off that particular publication altogether.  
Christiano’s point can be seen most clearly in the controlled 
context of formal political campaigns. Consider what happens when to-
tal spending on a campaign goes up – say from one to two billion dollars. 
Even though the amount of resources devoted to campaigning has dou-
bled, it’s highly unlikely that the amount of time voters spend thinking 
about the election will increase at all, let alone double. In the USA, for 
example, campaign spending has dramatically and continually increased 
while turnout has remained relatively constant since the early twentieth 
century. So, if voters are spending the same amount of time thinking 
about politics, where will that extra billion dollars go? We might think 
of the situation as akin to a market in which the demand for political 
attention has doubled while the supply of political attention is inelastic. 
The predictable consequence is that all the extra money spent campaign-
ing will merely bid up the metaphorical “price” of attention. This might 
happen in two ways. The candidates might spend their money making 
their campaigns slicker – more likely to attract voters’ attention relative 
to other uses of time, or their competitors’ campaigns. The price of 
attention can also be bid up in a more literal fashion. Owners of bill-
boards, television stations and newspapers effectively control a certain 
slice of public attention that they can sell to the highest bidder. Increas-
ing aggregate political spending will literally bid up the price of public 
attention by bidding up the price of advertising space.6 Additional 
 
6 A striking observation of this was provided by Michael Bloomberg’s 2020 
US Democratic Party presidential primary campaign (King 2020). To my 
knowledge, the topic has not been seriously investigated by social scientists. 
Fowler and Ridout (2010, 5) speculate that increased demand for political 
advertising space on TV could explain why both the price and the volume of 
political ads has increased in the US. 
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political speech can have the effect of drowning out the speech of others 
by bidding up the price of political attention to a level only the rich can 
afford. 
If everyone contributed equally to political debate, it would not 
be an epistemic problem that the political speech that is actually at-
tended to is subject to scarcity. A problem arises when certain groups 
have a higher tendency to speak than others, and when these differences 
also correlate with substantive differences in political perspectives. 
Richer people contribute to political campaigns far out of proportion to 
their numbers (Center for Responsive Politics 2016; The Electoral 
Commission 2019; see below for discussion). In the first place, this is 
simply because richer people have more money than other people to 
spend on campaign donations, just like everything else. In the second 
place, it’s because spending on politics is a “superior good”, the demand 
for which tends to increase disproportionately as people become more 
affluent. When scarce access to public attention is effectively rationed 
by a market mechanism, it shouldn’t be surprising that this access is dis-
proportionately purchased by the wealthy. 
Compared to formal political campaigns, drowning-out is 
harder to establish when it comes to the informal public sphere. One 
section of the public sphere, including think-tanks, campaigning groups 
and lobbyists, is primarily funded by voluntary donations. The audience 
for such organisations is usually legislators and regulators directly, ra-
ther than voters. Donor-funded organisations of these kinds are subject 
to the same dynamic that was discussed in the previous paragraph for 
formal political campaigns. Their funding tends to be dominated by the 
rich, for similar reasons.7  
However, another section of the public sphere, including news-
papers, TV stations and other media, is primarily funded by audience 
subscriptions and advertising revenue. This section of the public sphere 
is forced by the discipline of the market to cater to the preferences of 
audiences rather than those of donors, and so is not subject to the same 
dynamic as political campaigns. 
Nonetheless, even for these non-donation-funded parts of the 
informal public sphere, there are three mechanisms that might cause the 
rich to contribute a disproportionate share of political speech. First, ad-
vertisers (in the aggregate) target not merely the largest audiences, but 
the wealthiest audiences. Insofar as media firms seek advertising reve-
nue, they are therefore incentivised to cater to the preferences of 
wealthier audiences in particular, even though their media products are 
also consumed by poorer audiences.  
Second, media workers disproportionately come from privi-
leged social origins. In the UK, 36% of journalists had parents who were 
higher managers and professionals (as opposed to 9% of the general pop-
ulation), while only 8% had parents from routine and semi-routine oc-
cupations (as opposed to 37% of the general population) (Friedman, 
 
7 The extent to which think tanks rely on wealthy individuals and companies 
for funding is documented for the USA by (Domhoff 2014; Medvetz 2012), 
for Canada by (McLevey 2014) and for Spain by (Parrilla, Almiron, and Xifra 
2016). 
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Laurison, and Miles 2015, 273; See also Spilsbury 2018; Sutton Trust 
and Social Mobility Commission 2019). In the USA, journalists at the 
New York Times and Wall Street Journal were around 50 times more likely 
to have attended an elite university than the general population (Wai 
and Perina 2018). Journalists around the world are more likely to be 
male and university educated (Willnat, Weaver, and Choi 2013), while 
journalists in the USA and UK are less likely to come from ethnic mi-
norities (Weaver, Willnat, and Wilhoit 2019; Spilsbury 2018). The in-
trinsic desirability of media jobs renders them highly competitive. Em-
ployers can demand high quantities of cultural and social capital. Those 
who possess this capital tend to come from rich backgrounds. Further-
more, employers can also demand years of unpaid internships or inse-
cure freelance work. This similarly filters out candidates from poorer 
backgrounds.  
Third, media ownership in most countries is highly concen-
trated. Studying thirteen countries, Eli Noam and his collaborators 
(2016, 8) found that on average the top four companies accounted for 
67% of the market for media content generation (distribution platforms 
were even more concentrated). Media content companies are also unu-
sually likely to be controlled by individuals or families (rather than a 
wide base of shareholders). In a study of 97 countries, Djankov et al 
(2003, 357) found that 57% of newspapers and 34% of TV stations were 
controlled by families. Putting content and platforms together, Noam 
(2016, 1197) estimated somewhere between 8 and 16% of the global 
media market was owned by just thirty individuals.  
How strongly the second and third mechanisms operate de-
pends very much on whether market discipline forces media outlets to 
cater to the pre-existing political preferences of their audiences, or 
whether media workers and owners have some slack to produce content 
that reflects their own political perspectives. Furthermore, some media 
owners may simply be willing to subsidise the promotion of their polit-
ical views, accepting lower profits as the cost of doing so. An interesting 
example is the Sinclair Broadcast Group, which has been buying local 
TV stations in the US, sharply slanting their coverage to the ideological 
right, and apparently suffering a slight decrease in viewership as a result 
(Matthews 2018). I will not attempt to pronounce on these issues here, 
although they will obviously affect the strength of the argument we will 
be left with. 
One might object that the picture painted above is increasingly 
disrupted by new internet technologies. For the reasons given, it seems 
unlikely the internet has significantly increased the amount of time peo-
ple spend on politics. More plausible is that the media is becoming in-
creasingly segmented along ideological lines. “Filter bubbles” of this 
kind of course raise their own challenge to epistemic diversity. How-
ever, there is no necessary reason to think that increased segmentation 
would mitigate the pro-rich mechanism identified above, which may 
continue to apply within each of the more segmented media subsystems. 
Moreover, while some novel forms of online propaganda have been 
funded by foreign governments, others (such as the activities of Cam-
bridge Analytica) have been funded by wealthy individuals, and so 
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remain subject to the same pro-rich skew described above (Cadwalladr 
and Graham-Harrison 2018). Finally, we should remember that while 
the trend is certainly towards online media, there is still a long way to 
go. For example, in a 2019 survey, 65% of UK respondents and 63% of 
US respondents reported that their first contact with the day’s news was 
from an offline source (Newman 2019, 16). 
Cognitive scarcity means that the non-wealthy find it more dif-
ficult to pay for the prime real-estate of public attention. Coupled with 
the correlation between wealth and substantive political perspectives, 
this means that audiences in the laissez-faire public sphere will pay at-
tention to a set of sources that are skewed towards the perspectives fa-
voured by the rich.  
5. EQUALITY AS A CONTRIBUTOR TO DIVERSITY 
In the previous section, I argued that: 
In a laissez-faire public sphere, the political speech that is actu-
ally listened to is skewed towards the perspectives of the rich. 
The final step of my argument is that this leads audiences towards a less 
diverse set of relevant arguments and evidence, reducing citizens’ rele-
vant political knowledge. Because the arguments and evidence people 
are exposed to derive disproportionately from the rich, people are ex-
posed to a less diverse set of arguments and evidence. 
The pro-rich skew reduces diversity because being rich tends to 
go along with a particular ideology: the income or wealth of speakers 
makes a significant difference to the content of what is spoken. Income 
and wealth are excellent predictors of party political affiliation and of 
stances on a whole host of issues.8 This kind of skew in the set of per-
spectives that are publicly represented is an important one, because the 
kinds of class-based issues that correlate most closely with income are 
among the most important political issues in contemporary democra-
cies. 
Moreover, the rich who fund campaigns are also relatively ho-
mogenous simply because they are a fairly small group. The ten largest 
individual donors accounted for six percent of all campaign donations in 
the USA in the 2016 cycle (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). Of 
course, the USA is an exceptional case. But in the UK, where the 
amount spent on campaigning per voter was twenty times lower, the 
top 1163 registered donors still accounted for half of all private funding 
for political parties in 2017.9 As a matter of raw numbers, groups of this 
size will be less cognitively diverse than the population as a whole. 
Moreover, wealth is also highly correlated with certain other character-
istics, such as race, gender and occupation, leading rich donor to be 
much more homogenous than a randomly selected group of the same 
size. 
 
8 This has been documented many times; (Peterson 2016) is one recent ex-
ample. 
9 This statistic is compiled from the UK Electoral Commission’s (2019) pub-
lic database, available at http://search.electoralcommission.org.uk. 
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There is no suggestion here of quid-pro-quo corruption, of do-
nors expecting to receive favours from politicians in return for their 
contributions (that would be a separate, normatively simpler issue). Do-
nors might be motivated solely by moral considerations and seeking to 
advance the common good as they see it. The concern is not with their 
intentions. The problem is with the consequence: that the kinds of ar-
guments and evidence that tend to be put forward by wealthier people 
drown out the kinds of arguments and evidence that tend to be put for-
ward by poorer people. The correlation of riches and perspectives is 
consistent with thinking that people vote for the common good rather 
than for personal interest: it simply implies that their political beliefs 
tend to be skewed in favour of people like them.10  
The pro-rich skew can operate in practice along a spectrum 
from the most general level of ideology to the most specific level of 
factual details. At the general level of ideology, audiences will tend to 
become more familiar with the broad outlines of ideologies favoured by 
the rich. For example, people might become familiar with arguments 
about the value of individual freedom or the causal influence of hard 
work, neglecting arguments about the value of distributive equality or 
the causal influence of social structures. This corresponds to the exam-
ples I gave in section two of people who are only exposed to one type 
of economic theory, or only interact with members of one social class. 
At the specific level of factual detail, audiences will tend to be-
come familiar with the virtues of pro-rich candidates and the vices of 
anti-rich candidates. This was the example presented in section two fea-
turing the Red and Blue parties. For example, audiences will tend to 
learn more from adverts about the unpopular stances taken by anti-rich 
candidates, relative to what they learn about the unpopular stances 
taken by pro-rich candidates. Between these general ideological frame-
works and specific factual details there are a variety of ways bias can 
creep in, for example in people’s relative familiarity with arguments 
about the merits and the disadvantages of particular policies. 
Once again, it should be emphasised that the quantity of true 
beliefs people have can come apart from the kind of relevant political 
knowledge that we want to promote. In a well-resourced laissez-faire 
public sphere, audiences may have a greater quantity of true beliefs 
about politics than an egalitarian public sphere. But if the sources for 
these beliefs are less diverse, the quality of their relevant political 
knowledge will be lower. Under these conditions the speech of the rich 
in the laissez-faire public sphere has a negative epistemic impact in ab-
solute terms. This is not because these speech acts are misleading in 
themselves, but because they are misleading when placed in the broader 
 
10 Cf. James Madison (1987): “As long as the reason of man continues falli-
ble, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As 
long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opin-
ions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other; and the 
former will be objects to which the latter will attach themselves.” That most 
voting is oriented towards the common good (as the voter sees it) is agreed 
by contemporary critics of democracy (Caplan 2011; Somin 2013; Brennan 
2016). 
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context of a skewed distribution of speech. In another situation, the 
same speech-act might be epistemically valuable. Even if measures to 
create a more egalitarian public sphere reduced the total quantity of po-
litical speech, this would still increase epistemic value, because audi-
ences would become familiar with a more diverse range of arguments 
and evidence.  
To sum up: due to the pro-rich skew in the public sphere, au-
diences will predominantly be exposed to those ideologies and those 
facts which rich donors wish to broadcast. Consequently, audiences will 
attend to a less diverse set of arguments and evidence. On the other 
hand, in a more egalitarian public sphere, audiences would hear per-
spectives favoured by people of different levels of income and wealth. 
Consequently, audiences in a more egalitarian public sphere would at-
tend to a more diverse set of arguments and evidence. 
The egalitarian public sphere is a way of framing “equal oppor-
tunities” for political influence or political speech.11 To give content to 
the idea of equal opportunities, one must specify which factors are taken 
to be legitimately relevant or not in influencing the outcome. My defi-
nition of the egalitarian public sphere focuses on income and wealth as 
illegitimate influences on the distribution of political speech (not merely 
as it is spoken, but as it is listened to). I choose this framing to focus our 
minds away from equality of opportunity for speech at the individual 
level and towards inegalitarian tendencies we observe in the public 
sphere as a whole, which can be shifted with public policy. 
Before concluding, it may be helpful to briefly set out some of 
the concrete ways the abstract goal of an egalitarian public sphere might 
be advanced. Beitz draws a distinction between strategies of redistribution 
and strategies of insulation (Beitz 1990, 193; cf. Machin 2012). Strate-
gies of redistribution cut the Gordian knot of money in politics by 
simply reducing economic inequality itself. The epistemic argument 
against money in politics simply functions as an additional consideration 
in favour of distributive equality.  
Strategies of insulation instead seek to reduce the influence 
money has on politics and political speech. Insulation is necessarily more 
complex, and requires greater elaboration.  
Insulation is easiest to achieve in the formal context of election 
campaigns. My argument here has provided a basis for limiting the 
amount of money citizens can contribute to political campaigns, even 
where such limits reduce net spending on campaigning. However, con-
tribution limits should also be accompanied with some manner of public 
funding. Even in the absence of contribution limits, public funding can 
still function positively to increase the representation of perspectives 
not favoured by the rich.12 
In aiming to eliminate the differential influence of money, I take 
no further stance on what should or should not influence who speaks 
 
11 All the commentators cited here are keen to stress that, due to the epis-
temic element of speech, equality of actual influence would be an inappropri-
ate goal. On this point see in particular (Ortiz 1998). 
12 For empirical evidence on the relative efficacy of contribution limits and 
public funding, see (Scarrow 2007). 
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and who is listened to. In particular, an egalitarian public sphere as I 
define it is consistent with a variety of principles for funding political 
campaigns. It is compatible with ensuring that all credible candidates 
have (only) the same amount of public funding.13 But it is also compati-
ble with systems under which candidates with greater public support 
enjoy greater funds. 
In the ordinary course of politics and in the broader public 
sphere, insulation is much more difficult to achieve. However, there are 
still measures worth considering. Insofar as wealthy media proprietors 
influence the content their organisations produce, this is a reason to leg-
islate against the concentration of media ownership. Insofar as media 
content is influenced by the privileged social backgrounds of its crea-
tors, this is a further reason to make it easier for people with less privi-
leged backgrounds to enter media and political careers. There are many 
ways to attempt this, but a start would be to make it harder for media 
and political organisations to employ unpaid interns.  
An important subset of insulation strategies work through com-
pensation: creating an egalitarian distribution not by reducing the speech 
of the over-represented, but by increasing the speech of the under-rep-
resented. This is particularly important in the informal public sphere, 
where restrictions are more likely to raise concerns about expressive 
elements of free speech (Christiano 2012, 255). 
Traditional publicly funded discursive institutions such as state 
broadcasters and public universities could be interpreted as performing 
a compensatory role of this kind through their mission to promote a 
balanced debate. My argument accordingly offers some support to such 
institutions. It also gives institutions like universities reason to be more 
leery of accepting private donations that come with ideological strings 
attached.  
In addition, we might seek new ways of subsidising the speech 
of the poor through voucher schemes, as Christiano (2012, 255) sug-
gests. Christiano does not indicate how this might work, but we could 
take inspiration from schemes recently proposed in reaction to worries 
about the decline of news journalism. John Nichols and Robert 
McChesney (2016, 259–63), for example, propose giving citizens 
vouchers which they can bestow on non-profit news outlets.14 Although 
their proposal is inspired by a conception of journalism as a public good, 
it would also have the effect of giving poorer citizens more influence 
over journalistic content. This type of proposal could be extended be-
yond reporting to cover the kind of advocacy and analysis currently pro-
vided mainly by donor-funded organisations. 
 
13 For critique of which see (Pevnick 2019). To be clear, "levelling the play-
ing field" in this sense may not be sufficient for an egalitarian public sphere, 
because there may be more candidates from wealthy backgrounds. If so, 
maintaining an egalitarian public sphere would require further policies to en-
courage more candidates from poorer backgrounds to participate. 
14 For an related proposal see (Ackerman 2013). 
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CONCLUSION 
This paper has set out an epistemic argument in favour of an 
egalitarian public sphere, regulated such that the distribution of political 
speech is independent of the distribution of income or wealth. The nor-
mative premise of this argument was that the design of the political sys-
tem should promote the relevant knowledge of political decision-mak-
ers. This directs us to promote the diversity of arguments and evidence 
voters are exposed to. I argued that under certain circumstances we can 
best do so by creating a more egalitarian public sphere, removing some 
of the differential influence of money in politics.  
The argument for an egalitarian public sphere that I have pre-
sented is limited in several ways, some of which could helpfully be clar-
ified by further empirical work in the future. There are three core 
premises on which the argument could be challenged:  
1. Wealth or income correlates with differences in substantive po-
litical perspectives 
2. The rich contribute a disproportionate share of political speech 
compared to the poor 
3. Political speech is subject to scarcity, such that more speech by 
some can drown out others 
For the sake of simplicity, I have presented these three premises as con-
ditions, but it would be more accurate to view them as continuous var-
iables. The values of these variables determine the strength of the case 
for egalitarian regulations. Thus, the argument for a more egalitarianism 
public sphere is stronger the more the rich contribute compared to the 
poor, the more riches correlate with substantive perspectives, and the 
more political speech is subject to scarcity. 
The first premise is relatively uncontroversial, and the second 
is also well established for the case of formal political campaigns. It is 
harder to argue for the second premise for the informal public sphere, 
because the mechanisms through which the rich contribute more speech 
than the poor in this context are subtler and harder to measure. The 
third premise is also easier to establish for formal political campaigns 
than for the informal public sphere. Formal campaigns are subject to 
tight time constraints, and voters’ attention spans are often very limited. 
This suggests that the epistemic case for egalitarian interven-
tions will be easiest for formal political campaigns and harder to make 
for the informal public sphere. Appropriate empirical research could 
help to clarify these contested questions. However, we should also be 
wary of drawing conclusions too quickly from existing research. For ex-
ample, on standard measures, political ignorance is relatively invariant 
between different jurisdictions, even when regulations on political 
speech vary considerably (Somin 2013; Caplan 2011). This might be 
taken to indicate that political knowledge is overwhelmingly deter-
mined by “demand-side” influences, with “supply-side” influences (such 
as the pro-rich skew discussed in this paper) having little effect. How-
ever, this inference would be too quick. Political knowledge is normally 
measured by testing whether respondents know uncontested political 
facts such as who occupies which political office. Diversity of 
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perspectives was never likely to increase this kind of knowledge (of un-
contested facts). Instead, diversity is supposed to increase voters’ 
knowledge of different moral or causal theories for evaluating govern-
ment, and different considerations for or against different candidates or 
options – things that political knowledge surveys are less likely to assess. 
Assessing the strength of the epistemic case for an egalitarian public 
sphere will thus require different kinds of empirical research, or more 
creative uses of existing data. 
Insofar as this argument has been successful, it provides a prac-
tical example of constitutional design within the framework of epis-
temic democracy. It shows how potentially controversial institutional 
recommendations can be made using only epistemic considerations 
which are neutral between different substantive conceptions of justice. 
Egalitarians should not abandon epistemic considerations to the advo-
cates of laissez-faire. An egalitarian public sphere is an invaluable re-
source for citizens to find out what they need to know. 
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